GENERAL COMMENTS: The information provided is fullof glittering generalities about the need for reforming the DOD personnelsystem, with few substantive items on which to base an opinion. How can onecomment on “issuances” that haven’t even been drafted? The general sense thatone gets is that the Secretary of Defense wants to elevate his (andmanagement’s) power to near dictatorial levels, while at the same timeessentially engaging in union busting. If “the labor system encourages adispute-oriented, adversarial relationship between management and labor”, thenthe goal of this new system is to simply cut the Unions out completely, insteadof engaging in meaningful dialogue and attempting to construct trueLabor-Management partnerships. The perfect example of this is the so-called“Working Groups”, conducted with absolutely no Union participation whatsoever. Despite transparent public relations statements by the Department to thecontrary, it is quite obvious from the lawsuits filed by the Unions that Laborhas been shut out. “Consultation” is nothing more than a euphemism for “wetell you what we are going to do”, period. DuringCongressional hearings on this issue, the Secretary asserted that thePentagon's broad mission requires greater "flexibility" in hiring,disciplining, compensating and assigning civilian personnel. In short, theSecretary wants the same "chain of command" authority over civilianpersonnel as he enjoys over uniformed military personnel. Neither theSecretary nor his subordinates offered any concrete examples to explain howunion rights have impinged on the Pentagon's “critical national securitymission” in the past. Although Congress acceded to the broad requests lodgedby the DOD, it attached certain strict conditions--including a specificrequirements that DOD observe legal requirements of labor relations statutesand that they involve duly elected unions in the development of the new system. The Pentagon has done neither. Although DOD has convened a dozen or moremeetings to "brief stakeholders" and to "solicit the views"of unions, there has been no information sharing from DOD and absolutely noresponse to repeated union requests for specific information as to exactly whatproblems management wishes to address with the adoption of NSPS.

The Civil Service was established and reformed in order toprovide a stable workforce to carry out the functions of the Government withoutthe influence of political cronyism or favoritism. If the sole discretion forpay raises rests with one’s supervisor, then DOD employees will receive raisesin many cases based on whether their boss likes him/her. Why is so much powerbeing concentrated in the hands of the Secretary who is a politicalappointee?

Subpart A, section 9901.106(a)(2)(ii): The Secretaryof Defense has sole and exclusive discretion to determine the number ofemployee representatives to be engaged in the continuing collaboration process. This allows the secretary to identify a low number of representatives thuspitting the Unions against each other for representative spaces.

Subpart A, section 9901.106(a)(6): Nothing in thecontinuing collaboration process will affect the right of the Secretary todetermine the content of implementing issuances and to make them effective atany time. This catchall law would allow the secretary to basically do anythinghe wants, whenever he wants, without regard to a collaborative effort.

Subpart B, section 9901.212(d): This sectionreferences another section (9901.514 Non-citizen hiring) that has nothing to dowith pay schedules and pay bands.

Subpart B, sections 9901.221 and 9901.222: Theclassification process does not include any provisions for collectivebargaining.

Subpart C, section 9901.311: The lack of specificsin the new pay system makes it very hard to comment on the new pay system. What are the pay bands? What are the levels of pay in each pay band? What isthe maximum pay in each pay band?

Subpart C, section 9901.311: To adequately providecomments on the proposed pay system the DOD should provide their implementingissuances prior to enacting the NSPS rules. Once the issuances are providedthe normal 30/30/30 process should be in effect. Obviously, the DOD, much likeDepartment of Homeland Security, plans on waiting until the 30/30/30 time framehas passed prior to implementing their issuance with specifics on the new paysystem. This is blatantly circumvents the entire process of commenting,collaborating, etc.

Subpart C, section 9901.312: The Secretary now hasthe authority to establish pay limitations, as opposed to Congress.

Subpart C, section 9901.313: The wording is verymisleading. It appears that employees are protected from losing money underthe new pay system. The statement is true employees (collectively) will notlose money because the money allocated for compensation will not be less thanthe amount without NSPS, but individually there is no guarantee that you willnot be affected. It specifically says that the “aggregate employees” are notdisadvantaged. There is no guarantee, individually, that you will not beaffected. These words only provide for the minimum funding for pay raises. The words lack specifics to guarantee the individual employee minimum payraises, including step increases, for acceptable performance. The words alsosay to the maximum extent practical, which gives the DOD and out from providingthe money necessary for minimum raises.

Subpart C, sections 9901.301 to 9901.373: Pay forperformance as outlined addresses all raises coming from an established pot ofmoney. This means to give the high performer a bigger raise, the money comesfrom someone else. What if everyone is performing at a high level? Pay raisesfor managers come out of the same pot of money. There are no checks andbalances in the proposed system to prevent favoritism, nepotism, cronyism, etc.

Subpart C, sections 9901.301 to 9901.373: How arepeople in development jobs 5/7/9, 7/9/11, etc. affected? There are no words toaddress personnel in these positions. Will promoting these people, as promisedthem during the hiring process, take money away from acceptable performers?

Subpart C, sections 9901.301 to 9901.373: Congresswill not control Pay Parity. This allows DOD to give us lower raises then theygive to the military (something they have been trying to do for years, butcongress has not allowed it). These changes will prevent congress fromensuring pay parity.

Subpart C, sections 9901.331 to 9901.334: If locality pay (local market supplements) is based on thecost of living of a geographical area, how can it legally be withheld ordispersed at different rates based on occupation? How does this agree with theFederal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA)? In that same law,Congress gave rating-based performance awards a specific legal authority forthe first time, but excluded locality pay from award calculations? Has therebeen a change to FEPCA?

Subpart C, sections 9901.301 to 9901.373: The step raises in the Civil Service system are like thelongevity raises the military receives. The DOD is not proposing to change theway the military is paid, why are they changing the way the civil servant whosupports the military member is paid?

Subpart C, 9901.322: Thisparagraph contradicts paragraph 9901.313. After addressing the expectedcompensation comparability in 9901.313 which leads one to believe that we willnot lose money as a result of NSPS, 9901.322 makes it clear that an employeemay have their rate of pay reduced due to availability of funds and missionrequirements. This will allow the DOD to reduce our Congressionally approvedpay raises to a lower amount. While NSPS purports to be for the purpose ofrewarding performance in the workplace, the reality is that a high-performingand acceptably performing employees can have their pay cut simply because theDOD has decided to use the money for mission requirements.

Subpart C, Section 9901.352: Under Reassignment - Involuntary moves should NEVER result in a reduction in payunder any circumstances.

Subpart D, Sections 9901.401 to 9901.409: Thecurrent appraisal system we use is a simple sat/unsat and we typically are latein getting these type of appraisals completed. If or when the appraisal systemchanges, the supervisors will fall even further behind. This affects bothworkers and supervisors, everything that is created that takes time away fromthe supervisor will eventually affect the workers and take time away from them,when the supervisor cannot properly supervise, train, mentor, etc.

Subpart D, Sections 9901.401 to 9901.409: How will the training required by these regulations befunded?

Subpart E, Section 9901.514: There might be times in other countries where the DOD would need to hirenon-citizens but this requirement should be changed to read "outsideCONUS". If the positions are located in the United States, only UScitizens should hold them. Priority should be given to US citizens for jobsoutside the US.

Subpart F, Sections 9901.601 to9901.611: The current retirement system implemented for Civil Servicepersonnel (FERS) is not equivalent to that in private industry. For example,the retirement annuity computation formula for Northrop Grumman Corporation is1.667% times the highest salary of the previous three years. FERS on the otherhand provides on 1% of base pay. Industry employees have the same or better401k and social security plans as well. For the employee, the total package ofPay, Benefits and retirement plan comes down to risk associated with the tenureof employment. That is to say that jobs with increased risk of lay-off, or"RIF" should carry a commensurate increase in pay, benefits andretirement. The NSPS, specifically with regard to workforce shaping, increasesthe government employee's risk of losing their job without a commensurateincrease in pay, benefits and retirement seen in private industry. If theemployees are expected to perform under commercial standards and at the samerisk of job loss, then the compensation, or at least the ability to bargain foradditional compensation by the employee, must also be factored into the system.

Subpart F, Sections 9901.601 to9901.611: By redefining competitive area (in reference to RIF situations),the DOD will be able to target groups of employees. In a RIF situation wherethese employees are selected to be released, because the competitive area is sonarrowly defined, these employees will not have the chance to bump or retreatto other areas, unless offered a vacant position at the Department’s option.

Subpart F, Section 9901.607: The wording is very misleading. Tenure is the first criteria for a reductionin force. However, an experienced employee recently assigned a new job couldbe the first to go in a RIF, without retreat rights to their previous job.

Subpart G, Sections 9901.714 and9901.715: Our current system provides an employee with a 30-day notice and15 days to reply. The new system changes the time requirements to 15-daynotice and only 10 days to reply. This will put undue time requirements onemployees and anyone that would be representing them. With the new rules fornon-disclosure of information this will make it virtually impossible foremployees to be able to defend themselves with questionable or untrue allegations.

Subpart G, Sections 9901.714 and9901.715: Reference Adverse Actions, how can the 15 day advanced noticeperiod and the 10-day reply period run concurrently? The period to reply runsout before the advance notice period ends. This does not make sense. Theperiod should not run concurrently, but serially.

Subpart H, Section 9901.807: The DOD is violating Federal Law with this section. The provisions of theNational Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 prohibit the majority ofthe changes in the Appellate Procedures proposed by NSPS. In fact, theNational Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 specifically states,“nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the waiver of anyprovision of law. For example, the proposed regulations give the Departmentsweeping authority to override or delay interim relief granted by the MSPB (theNational Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 simply states thatinterim relief can granted by the MSPB), the proposed regulations require apreponderance of the evidence (this legalese is different than the NationalDefense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 which simply requires an employeeto raise substantial questions of fact), the proposed regulations providelimitations on when the Department will be responsible for employee’s attorneysfees if the employee is the prevailing party (the National DefenseAuthorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 does not authorize this change). The DODdoes not have the authority to make the changes proposed in this section andquite frankly they are prohibited from making these changes.

Subpart I, Section 9901.905: This section references time limits in section 9901.908, there are no timelimits discussed in section 9901.908.

Subpart I, Sections 9901.901 to9901.928: Contrary to the National Defense Authorization Act of FiscalYear 2004 the DOD did not afford employee representatives the opportunity tohave meaningful discussions during the development of the proposedLabor-Management Relations.

Subpart I, Section 9901.907: The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 requires the DOD toprovide for independent third party review. The proposed National SecurityLabor Relations Board with Secretary appointed members is not an independentthird party.

Subpart I, Section 9901.901 to9901.928: The proposed changes in this section severely overstep theauthority of DOD as granted by the National Defense Authorization Act of FiscalYear 2004. There are no allowances in the National Defense Authorization Actof Fiscal Year 2004 to modify management rights or employee rights to theextent proposed. These changes strip Unions of the ability to provide basicrepresentation to employees, with the right to appeal decisions to an independentthird party, and will undermine employee’s rights.