| Comment Number: | EM-022820 |
| Received: | 3/16/2005 5:18:39 PM |
| Subject: | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment |
| Title: | National Security Personnel System |
| CFR Citation: | 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901 |
| No Attachments |
Comments:
March 16, 2005 DoD NSPS Comments , DoD NSPS Comments: DRAFT NSPS COMMENTS AFGE Local 400 These comments are provided by the leadership of Local 400 AFGE regarding Docket Number NSPS-2005-001, Regulation number (RIN) 3206-AK76/0790-AH82. Before addressing the specifics of the supplementary information, regulation, and in some cases other literature released by the Department of Defense during the public comment period, we provide the following general information. - Incomplete data. It is impossible to provide comprehensive and entirely accurate comments about NSPS, since only the enabling regulation has been released for public comment. It is extremely unfair to ask Employees to blindly evaluate, much less support, a system the details of which have not been revealed to them and will not be until such time as DoD sees fit to release ?implementing issuances.? - Comment period or lip service? Employees, and even their union representatives, are neither personnelists nor experts in legalese such as is found in the regulation we are asked to comment upon. o At our installation the CPAC told us at the start of the comment period that employees would not be allowed to review nor comment on the proposed regulation on duty time, nor be allowed to use government equipment to submit their comments. When we took the issue higher, Employees were afforded one hour to review and comment. If there is any doubt why in many cases we submitted form letters, there?s your answer. To allow an hour of duty time to review, digest, and comment upon a document of this magnitude is to pay lip service to having sought employee input. o There was no proactive education of employees by Management; in fact, we were repeatedly told that management should refrain from discussing the NSPS. o We embarked upon a vigorous campaign to try to ensure that all Employees knew about the comment period and to educate them about the NSPS. We were then notified by the installation labor attorney that we were not to speak of the NSPS on official time. This severely hampered our efforts to educate those we represent. - Format vs. substance. The instructions for submitting comments said to reference supplementary information heading and page number, and regulation subpart and section. We believe this has dissuaded some from preparing comments, especially those whose work is not primarily administratively technical, and that it may be used as a basis to discard some comments later. All comments need to be taken into consideration, whether or not they are in the proper format. - DoD literature during comment period. During the comment period there was no attempt to educate the workforce at this location other than by dissemination of some of DoD?s literature such as ?Myths and Facts.? These documents were not even distributed to all Employees. Many employees told us that they only received them through the Union. We were asked repeatedly when the ?official? information was going to be put out. Management has informed us they do not intend to even put out all literature provided by DoD on the subject, such as the letter our MEDDAC Commander was supposed to provide to her Employees. - Sole and unreviewable discretion. This phrase shows up continually throughout the NSPS. This is inappropriate even for the Secretary of Defense, because he does not own the DoD. It belongs to our nation whom he also serves. DoD must be answerable to our elected representatives in Congress. There is an old saying that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Like any other part of the government, DoD must be subject to checks and balances. - Our comments on NSPS and insistence on checks and balances should not be seen as critical of all managers and supervisors. Many have excellent skills and intentions and are doing the best they can with available resources and training. But people are people, and sometimes people who seek power are those who would abuse it. Checks and balances provided by Title 5 Chapter 71 are critical to success of our workforce and therefore our agency. - Throughout the NSPS there are references to modified versions of Title 5 Chapter 71. Why is it necessary to modify the statute specifically for DoD? What adverse effect has the Statute had on mission? - Purpose. We are told the purpose of NSPS is to improve our nation?s security. The provisions of NSPS look like they were written to do away with union rights. They look like they were written in response to a complaint we often hear from managers/supervisors who say that they would have done something about poor performance or conduct ?but the Union won?t let me.? Some of them actually appear to believe that they can?t do this or that because the Union won?t allow it. In reality the union cannot stop them from doing what is within the rules. When they take an action and do not follow the rules, however, the union has a responsibility to protect the employee?s rights, and that is how it should be. We have arranged our comments according to topic. For each topic, the supplementary information heading and page number are noted, as well as the regulation subpart and section. Supplementary Information Headings: General Provisions, Effective Dates, Continuing Collaboration process, page 7557; program evaluation. Subpart A, General Provisions, 9901.101. DoD should not begin to implement NSPS until all comments have been carefully considered. There needs to be true collaboration between DoD, OPM, and union representatives during the meet and confer period. Any member of Congress who wishes to be part of the meet and confer should be allowed to do so, either in person or by a representative from their staff. Sec. 9901.107, Relationship to other provisions: most people do not understand this. We believe there is no reason to modify 5 USC Chapter 71 in any manner in regard to DoD employees. We support continuance of EEO rules as they exist today, and recommend that EEO be afforded additional manpower because NSPS will increase the number of complaints taking that avenue (if the other current avenues of redress are revised as written in NSPS). Rather than exempt itself from rules on backpay, DoD should attempt to resolve the matters that result in backpay. If a DoD employee is owed backpay, their employer should not shirk responsibility for that. 9901.108 says that DoD will determine how the regulation and implementation of NSPS will be evaluated. Others need to be involved to make this a fair evaluation. Every manager and employee who has told us they?ve taken their personal time to read the regulation and supplement has expressed huge concerns about how mission will suffer under NSPS as proposed, yet the DoD releases that are supposed to go to the workforce make it sound like this proposal will cure all personnel problems in DoD. Any shortfalls that arise need to be objectively evaluated so as not to impede our mission of supporting the soldier and his family. Subpart B, Classification, page 7558. Subpart B, Classification, 9901.201 thru 9901.231 Currently we are under the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) classification standards. DoD plans to establish new classification standards. The OPM standards do not disable managers from assigning work of whatever type. What they do is make managers plan ahead and apply some kind of continuity to their planning. This is good for the mission. Expectations that change constantly are not good for the mission. There is no need for total flexibility in this area. Most jobs do not change. If you need a cook today, it?s still a cook you need tomorrow. Our overall mission of supporting the troops and families does not change, and neither do the vast majority of jobs required to perform that mission. The current system has accommodated changes due to technology, such as computers and new medical methods; it has the flexibility to support the mission. Why take the resources, money and time, to re-create the entire classification system? Why not identify what it lacks, if anything, and just write those? Literature distributed by DoD during the comment period says that employees ?may? be credited for time they had accrued toward their next step increase, at the time of conversion to pay banding. The literature makes it sound like some will get credit, some won?t. It needs to be done the same way across the board. We would like to know more about the provisions on page 7581 about converting an employee who is in retain grade status. We do not know how this will affect them, other than no one?s initial pay should be affected. Subpart C, Pay and Pay Administration, Setting and adjusting rate ranges, page 7559, 7560. Section 9901.313 National Security Compensation Comparability. Again, why is it necessary to recreate an entire pay system and all the rules to go with it? What?s wrong with the current system? The proposed system seems aimed at getting costs down at the expense of those who do the work, and that is not right. Section 9901.313 is very disappointing. After having assured employees that NSPS would not adversely affect their pay upon transfer to pay banding, DoD includes a provision that ?to the maximum extent practicable? employees IN THE AGGREGATE will not be disadvantaged in terms of the TOTAL AMOUNT OF PAY AVAILABLE. We don?t do our missions ?to the maximum extent practicable.? Employees are held accountable for their work performance personally, individually, not ?in the aggregate.? You cannot balance the books or pay for the war on the backs of those who do the work of supporting our soldiers and their families. Section 9901.322 Setting and adjusting rate ranges. Basically this tells us that DoD will adjust pay as it feels necessary. We have heard it said that this is like in private industry. Well, the Department of Defense is not a private industry and it never should be. We work for America and our allegiance needs to be to our country, the taxpayers. That is why the GS/FWS system needs to stay. Employees need to be able to do their work free of financial pressure from their boss or even the Secretary of Defense. Letting pay be internally controlled is asking for abuse of power. Let us not lose sight of the fact that ?no raise? automatically equals ?pay cut?, due to inflation. Section 9901.332 Local market supplements. How much will it cost to set local market supplements for every occupation and pay band? Why does DoD need the ability to set aside current locality determinations, and where does it get the expertise to do a better job than the Department of Labor in creating locality pay regions? Where are those resources coming from? Please do not tell us that our pay will be determined by contractors, like in the DHS plan. One factor in determining locality pay under NSPS is ?availability of funds.? The budget was tight in peacetime. It is worse during war and will remain that way. That does not make it any cheaper for us to live. If it?s optional to pay locality pay, it most likely will not be paid. Employees in the same locality should be getting the same locality pay. What provision is made for adjustment of pay for DoD employees who transfer from one area to another? Under the GS system it is easy to determine pay fairly and consistently. Let us note that Employees rated ?unacceptable? do not get step increases under the current system. They do get whatever pay increase is awarded across the board to all employees. That is as it should be, because until and unless their supervisor removes them from federal service, nothing has been proven about the acceptability of their work. If they are truly nonperformers, they will be removed. Section 9901.342 Performance payouts. NSPS is not a pay for performance system. It is a system for controlling employees through their paychecks ? and this is dangerous, particularly in DoD. Our allegiance needs to be to our country, not to whoever is appointed to head the DoD by the currently prevailing political party. Our current system is a pay for performance system. It allows for high performers to be paid more, and it allows for within grade increases to be withheld for nonperformance. We already have a high-performance culture that supports mission accomplishment, or we would not be able to accomplish our missions with the personnel shortages we have. And we do more than accomplish the mission, we excel at it. We support active performance management. Those managers and supervisors who do not actively manage performance under this system are not likely to do so under a new, unfamiliar system that does not allow Employees adequate recourse when supervisors fail to state expectations, provide periodic performance counselings, or provide evaluations on time. What is the problem with the current performance management system? In our experience The Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES) does everything with performance that NSPS is supposed to do. Our experience is that the only problem is when the regulation is not followed. In some cases this is because supervisors are not sure of the rules and they hesitate to take performanced based actions. So educate them. In other cases we have supervisors who have 40-60 direct reports plus a technical mission. How much effective performance management can they accomplish in a day, especially if they do have any employees with true performance problems? Under NSPS pay will managed via ?pay pools.? What level will the pay pools be managed at? Currently our pay is managed locally and Command has made intelligent and strategic use of the payroll funds available to them. They have managed to resource civilian pay despite funding shortages imposed by levels above them. For example, this installation won four commercial activities studies and has never been funded for the manpower we proved we needed in our Most Efficient Organizations (MEOs). If pay pools are managed above installation level, this will be another instance of NSPS not increasing managerial flexibility, as alleged, but actually taking away the ability of local managers to effectively manage the resources allocated to their mission. We have some experience with pay banding because we represent employees at the Army & Air Force Exchange Service. We have seen top ratings from supervisors be lowered by someone higher up the chain so that the Employee missed the level that they needed to earn an award their supervisor wanted them to have. We have little faith in objective ratings, and less if employees lose their current ability to challenge the ratings. Section 9901.343. Pay reduction based on unacceptable performance and/or conduct. This amounts to reclassifying positions based on temporary situations involving the incumbent. The mission is not going to change based on a performance or conduct issue. If a person stays 20 more years with the government, will they continue to be punished in their paycheck for something that happened 20 years ago? Section 9901.344. Other performance payments. What does the current pay system not allow employees to be paid for? ?Provide for other special circumstances? is a wide open door to abuse and cronyism. It really does sound like a ?friend of the supervisor? pay system. Section 9901.345. Treatment of developmental positions. We have this now, in the form of internships and upward mobility positions. Section 9901.361 Premium pay, general. We have seen supervisors abuse and misuse employees by working them very irregular, unpredictable schedules. Even under current rules, some supervisors tell employees they must take comp time (in lieu of overtime) and then try to tell them when they will take the comp time off. We do not know why it is necessary to change the current premium pay rates. We believe they are being changed to benefit the Employer, not the employees. This is short sighted and will not result in attracting and keeping the best and the brightest. Subpart D, Performance Management. Section 9901.401. We already have a system that supports all this. Without the implementing issuances, this section is all empty promises. Section 9901.405 Performance management system requirements. We support the need for an active, effective performance management system. However, we do not believe it is necessary to create an entirely new system. We already have a performance management system (The Army Performance Evaluation System) that provides for most of what is listed in this paragraph. Could it be a little better? Sure, any system can be improved upon, but that doesn?t mean we should throw the whole thing out and start over. We realize there are problems with how some managers and supervisors use TAPES. But the problem isn?t the tool, it?s how it?s used. If someone doesn?t know how to drive their Chevy, building them a new Ford isn?t going to make them a better driver. (Especially if the Ford turns out to have bugs of its own.) Section 9901.406. Setting and communicating performance expectations. Subpara (a) says that performance expectations will align with mission, strategic goals, organizational program and policy objective, performance plans, and other measures of performance. What do they think managers base performance standards on now, thin air? Employees, to include supervisors and managers, are always accountable for demonstrating professionalism and standards of appropriate conduct and behavior, such as civility and respect for others. The current system allows supervisors and managers to address conduct effectively. We do object to including behavior under conduct. Behavior is more subjective. An employee may be too quiet, too loud, too aggressive, too passive to suit different supervisors, but until and unless this affects job performance it is primarily a matter of personal taste. Section 9901.408. Developing performance and addressing poor performance. Nothing in the current system obliges supervisors to tolerate poor performance. They have a responsibility to develop staff members, and if performance doesn?t improve it can lead to removal. When we ask why something hasn?t been done about a poor performer, we are often told ?the union won?t let us.? That is a weak excuse for failure to do the job the supervisor was hired for. If performance actions are taken in accordance with the rules, the union is not going to have a problem with it. We have never seen anyone deliberately perform their job poorly, nor have we ever heard of such. If there are such cases, the table of penalties does allow supervisors to bring anyone up on charges who deliberately doesn?t do the job. Poor performance is not deliberate. It makes no sense to give an oral warning, reprimand, or adverse action or reduction in pay if a person is not able to do the job. These actions are tantamount to standing over them, waving your fist and yelling, ?Do it right!!? If they knew how and were able to, they would be doing it right in the first place and saving themselves the aggravation of having you yell at them. No amount of punishment is going to be effective in performance management. Provide resources for training. Convey expectations clearly. Allow for some errors ? The best leaders know that the only people who never make mistakes are people who never do anything else, either. And if someone is hired into a job and it turns out they can?t do it, place them elsewhere if you can use them productively, and if you have to remove them do it humanely. Performance management should not be a game of ?gotcha.? We do not approve of supervisors who ignore performance issues, because that means either the job isn?t getting done or some other employee is taking up the slack for someone whose performance needs improvement. In those cases where an employee gets a bad performance rating and comes to us for help, it is common for us to find that every prior evaluation is outstanding and no performance counselings have been done to let the employee know their performance needs improvement. We have seen supervisors approve a step increase (only authorized if work if of an acceptable level of competence) after initiating valid action to remove an employee for poor performance. We have proposed stronger performance management in contract negotiations but were unable to convince Management to commit to a strong system supporting high performance and mission accomplishment because our proposals put the responsibility for performance management on management. 9901.409 Rating and rewarding performance. Again we are told that the details will be in the implementing issuances, to be given out later. It would be easy to give a person a poor rating in order to RIF or otherwise remove them, or to encourage them to leave by taking away pay. This looks to us like the same ploy used we were told that appropriated fund positions would be converted to nonappropriated fund positions, but ?only through attrition.? We were specifically assured that only vacant positions would be converted. It soon became apparent that the intent was to use any means available to convince employees to leave. Union representatives will be extremely vulnerable under NSPS?s performance evaluation plan. In the past we have had supervisors who rated employees poorly because they were out of the activity on union business agreed to in our contract. We have also had supervisors who simply did not believe in unions and questioned the judgement or loyalty of anyone who would belong, much less be a union rep. We have also had supervisors berate union representatives because they didn?t think we should have taken a particular case, disagreed with our position on an issue, or thought we should be required to take leave for all union work. Under NSPS, all these unfounded objections would reflect in our ratings and we would lack Title 5 protections. We already have supervisors telling employees, ?Wait till July ? the union won?t be able to help you then.? If our jobs are in jeopardy, we may not be able to help ourselves. Some union representatives are full time. Our local president has not been rated by the agency for this reason since 1995. This must not be counted against her for purposes of pay, RIF retention, or other working conditions. Subpart E, Staffing and Development, Page 7563, including probationary periods. Section 9901.501 through 9901.516; probationary periods 9901.512 Probationary periods need to be standard and not based on someone?s perceptions of the individual employee. Managers must not be allowed to make employees serve new probationary periods, because this will be used against anyone the supervisor did not get to choose personally, i.e., stoppers such as veterans, military spouses, individuals reassigned due to medical concerns or on the job injuries, etc. We have seen that the current hiring system allows managers in most cases to legally hire who they want to hire. NSPS expands that authority when in reality DoD needs to be subjected to stricter hiring criteria. If security truly is our concern, why give managers the ability to hire their friends? That is not going to increase security, it?s going to increase cronyism. There?s enough of that now. Subpart F, Workforce Shaping, page 7564. Subpart F, Workplace Shaping, 9901.601 through 9901.611 Seniority needs to be retained. People do not get seniority for sitting around for 20 years. They get seniority because they have done the work for 20 years. If they were incompetent their supervisors would have removed them; supervisors have the ability and responsibility under the current system. Seniority is much more important than NSPS makes it out to be. What we?ve read from DoD tells us we need to get over our need for ?longevity.? Well, the only reason we are able to get the mission done with the severe manpower shortages we have is that we have experienced employees who don?t have to stop and find someone who knows what to do next, what can be done and how to get it done. How can NSPS take seniority away from civilian employees, when it is so important in the military? Whenever two soldiers of the same rank work together, ask them who is senior and they will know who that is, based on date of rank. Not on their evaluations, but on their date of rank. We realize DoD wants to get out of the personnel business and that senior employees cost more. DoD should not get out of the personnel business, because support of our nation?s defense must not be left to contractors whose reason for existence is to make a profit. Senior employees cost more because they are worth more: they?ve received more training and they have experience in getting the job done. The regulation allows competitive area for RIF to be manipulated. Currently employees have some level of job security based on how broad the area is that they can be placed in. Under NSPS this could be manipulated so that only the position held by a particular employee is affected. Retention factors for RIF must not be left open to ?such as other factors as the Secretary considers necessary and appropriate.? First, the Secretary is an appointee. The person in that position will change. Secondly, RIF factors need to be objective, not subjective. Take an admirable trait like loyalty. The Secretary may feel loyalty is important enough to be a RIF retention factor. We do not dispute that loyalty is an admirable trait and loyalty to our soldiers and our country is essential. But we have seen managers consider that loyalty to them, personally, is part of an employee?s job, whereas our loyalty needs to be to the mission and our country. We have seen managers berate employees for disloyalty because they put in for a promotion, took time off work due to family illness, or told the truth in an investigation. Subpart G, Adverse Actions, page 7564, including mandatory removal offenses. Subpart G, adverse actions, sections 9901.701 through 9901.717. There is no doubt that removal from federal service is appropriate in some cases. Supervisors can remove employees from federal service now. Does DoD think supervisors do not do so often enough? Do they fail to do so when necessary? Does DoD want to ignore the supervisor?s judgement in cases where the supervisor believes there is reason for a penalty less than removal? NSPS purports to support due process, but what is due process if the result (removal) is mandatory? To support mandatory removal is like supporting a mandatory death penalty, no questions asked. Just giving Employees time to respond is not due process. Negotiated grievance and disciplinary procedures need to remain in place, as well as true third party appeals. Management must not be able to disallow the Employee?s chosen union representative. Subpart H, Appeals, page 7565; MSPS, page 7566 through 7568. Subpart H ? Appeals, 9901.801 through 9901.810. NSPS increases the standard of proof on performance issues, which is contrary to its stated purpose. DoD should not limit the ability of employees to access the MSPB, nor shorten the timeframe to file with MSPB. MSPB and arbitrators need to retain full authority as they have now, to include the ability to mitigate. The standard of ?wholly without justification? seems to be a deliberate attempt to set DoD personnel issues above the law or outside it. Subpart I ? Labor-Management relations. Page 7569-7971. Sections 9901.901 through 9901.928. Overall, the premise of NSPS seems to be that Employee and union rights under 5 USC are incompatible with national security. That is not true. The rights of Unions and employees are a ?target of opportunity,? in that our rights have been targeted for some time, and the opportunity now presents itself to use buzzwords like ?9/11? and the ?global war on terror? for the purpose of shutting up employees and their representatives. 9901.905 Impact on existing agreements. The agreements in question are not ?union agreements.? Every collective bargaining agreement was agreed to by Management and approved by the higher headquarters; in our case it was approved by Department of the Army. Did DA not know what it was doing? Did it agree to things it should not have? 9901.907 National Security Labor Relations Board (NSLRB). We believe it is very dangerous to allow the country?s military to be judge, jury, and hangman over its workforce. It also does not make sense to create the NSLRB when other organizations already exist to do these functions and resources withing DoD are stretched to the point where decisions are having to be made about cutting services and resources for our troops. By limiting the scope of bargaining, DoD is in effect refusing to hear the concerns and views of its workforce through its elected representatives. Taking permissive subjects off the table impacts managers more than it does the unions. It takes away managers? ability to negotiate on these things when they believe it is in the best interests of the organization. Again, we have seen no operational reasons for this proposed change, and instead of creating flexibilities for supervisors it takes away their discretion. 9901.912 Determination of appropriate units for labor organization. These provisions may be an improvement over DoD?s Concept Plan released in February 2004, but there is still no legitimate reason to narrow the types of employees eligible for union representation. Supervisory duties should remove an employee from the bargaining unit if they are supervising bargaining unit members, but supervising military and being union eligible are not incompatible. We also note that the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) has already made an internal determination (not yet implemented) that none of its contracting specialists meeting eligibility requirements for union representation. Nothing has changed in the law, yet here is a significant part of Army wanting to abolish union representation for its employees. 9901.914 Representation rights and duties. Employees being questioned by any representative of the Agency ? be it law enforcement, Inspector General, Criminal Investigation, etc. ? about matters related to their employment should be authorized a union representative. The representative cannot obstruct the investigation, so what is the problem? We handle investigatory meetings by advising the Employee beforehand that they needed to be entirely truthful and respectful. During the investigation we do not attempt to answer for the employee but we do talk to the investigator to clarify if they seem to be using terms the Employee doesn?t understand or vice versa. We have also sometimes attended ?sensing session? type meetings by such agencies as the IG where Employees were questioned in groups or individually. Unfortunately we have had the experience of listening to employees express various legitimate and significant concerns only to find out later that the Commander was outbriefed that there were no issues raised. We were able to tell the Commander what issues were raised in his organization. Employees should retain Title 5 rights to a representative in formal and investigatory meetings. We have found that it takes a lot longer to investigate and close out issues where we were not included from the beginning. Having us there ? even when not statutorily required ? has in the past allowed Union and Management to approach issues together and eliminate any he said/she said afterward. If we are not there and an Employee alleges the manager said or did something wrong, we have to address that. Being at such meetings has also allowed us to present a united front with Management on performance and conduct issues, thus speeding up the remedy. 9901.921 Standards of conduct for labor organizations. There may be instances where an Employee acting as a union representative goes beyond their role and is truly inappropriate. The current system gives Management recourse in those cases. Our representatives are at least as professional and informed as the managers they deal with. An Employee who acts as a union representative needs to be protected in that role. Every time we raise an issue or ask a question, it may be taken as insubordination or other misconduct. Unfortunately the very managers who are most likely to take offense are those who enjoy abusing personal power and are likely not operating within the rules they are subject to as DoD workers themselves. It is our experience that in many cases we are much more open and truthful with Commanders than the managers who answer to them. We can afford to be because we are not responding as their subordinates, like the managers are. We normally can offer our views without worrying about it showing up on our performance evaluations. This is to the advantage of Command and gives them additional eyes and ears they can trust. A lot more things can be hidden, even from Command, if there is no union to tell what the employees are seeing. We have had managers tell us that the problem with the Unions is that they are always telling Command things that are none of their (Command?s) business. Having the Union around keeps some people honest. Some managers object to union representatives in general. They constantly accuse us now of hidden agendas, untruths, and every other type of misconduct, especially when we disagree with them. Under NSPS they would be able to threaten our jobs. Information requests. We believe in being reasonable about our data requests. If we ask for a supervisory file and the supervisor says there is information in the file not germaine (i.e., training records and we are working a timecard issue) we will exempt that part of the file. But we should not be required to do FOIA requests or to go hunting and gathering documents that the supervisor must have had when they took an action on the employee. We are already under strict time constraints to present complaints and we have limited official time. Management should be ready and willing to provide documentation supporting their actions, and they should do so within a suspense that allows us to be timely on the representational action we need the documents for. For example, if management cannot provide copies of timecards until the grievance period is up, the grievance period should be extended so that it is not due until 15 days after we receive the materials relied upon. It should also not be up to Management to decide that we do not need certain information. Of course they are not going to opt to give it to us if it proves our case. 9901.916 Unfair labor practices. Collective bargaining agreements need to take precedence over any new regulations. Management agreed to these for good and valid reasons and the agency heads approved them. To abolish them or repudiate portions is simply not good faith. The statutory 6-month time period for filing unfair labor practices should remain and not be shortened. 9901.917 Duty to bargain and consult. To put arbitrary time limits on how long it can take to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement ignores the mission context in which bargaining may be taking place. Will bargaining take place for 90 straight days, regardless of whether managers and union representatives are needed for mission? These arbitrary limits take away any flexibility in scheduling negotiating sessions. Many times management has told us they did not want to negotiate on a particular day due to training holidays, other missions, or scheduled events. They will lose that flexibility. Also, management may delay or stall negotiations knowing full well that DoD will approve their proposals. Regulations and other directives should not bar bargaining. There is no reason to limit Title 5 provisions in regard to DoD employees and their unions. 9901.918 Multi-unit bargaining. We have no problem with multi-unit bargaining where it is agreed upon by all parties. We do that today. But the Agency has the obligation to bargain with all parties, whereas the other parties have no bargaining obligations toward each other each other. There are times when the interests, needs, and concerns of the units are not the same. 9901.919 Collective bargaining above the level of recognition. The FLRA has certified the Local as exclusive representative. No one else is certified to negotiate on behalf of the employees we represent. Agreements made above the level of recognition are going to be about as relevant as a policy on plowing two feet of snow written in Atlanta, and about as workable. This is an incredibly one-sided plan. DoD gets to decide whether or not DoD?s proposals get implemented. This is not bargaining. 9901.920 Impasse procedures. Again, this is one-sided. Either party may ask DoD?s board whether or not DoD?s proposals get implemented. 9901.922 Grievance procedures. Why exclude performance appraisals and mandatory removal offenses from the grievance procedure? What real recourse does an employee have when a supervisor does not follow the rules for either of these procedures? If managers cannot follow the rules in rating or disciplining employees, the union needs to be able to effectively challenge that. 9901.923 Exceptions to arbitration awards. This renders arbitration useless because all the agency has to say is that the matter involves security. (We work for our national defense. Everything can be tied to security, but not everything is a security issue. Security is often used as a smokescreen.) 9901.924 Official time. NSPS purports to leave official time provisions essentially the same, but the mindset of DoD as conveyed through the personnel channels from CHRA on down is that very little is representational. We were told that we could not discuss NSPS with bargaining unit members on official time because it was ?not representational.? Employees were allowed one hour of duty time to respond, but could not consult their union representatives when those reps were on official time. In conclusion, we agree that our personnel system needs to support our mission, and for the most part it does. If there are areas where it falls short then let?s identify what the problems are and fix them. This needs to be done within the framework of union representation as provided for by 5 USC Chapter 71. NSPS?s approach appears to be that the Employee and Union rights are the problem, and that is simply not true. On behalf of AFGE Local 400. Sincerely, on behalf of AFGE Local 400