Comment Number: | OL-10501365 |
Received: | 2/24/2005 5:09:10 PM |
Subject: | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment |
Title: | National Security Personnel System |
CFR Citation: | 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901 |
No Attachments |
Comments:
Subpart C National Security Compensation Comparability Use of the term “pay in aggregate” allows DOD to easily defeat the intent of Congress to ensure individual members do not experience a reduction in pay as a result of the transfer to NSPS. This term only requires DOD to ensure that the overall amount of money available for civilian personnel is not reduced, but does not prevent the agency from “robbing” the funds from one location or activity to enhance the pay available to those in a more favored location or activity. I recommend that DOD shall ensure that during the specified transaction period that personnel funding per activity (adjusted for changes in the number of personnel employed, etc.) will not be less then would have been available under the GS system. Setting and Adjusting Rate Ranges The rate ranges are subject among other thing to “overall budget constraints.” This would appear to make it possible for DOD to adjust rate ranges downward. If DOD adjusts a rate range downward it would presumably result in pay reductions, at least for those who’s pay is at the upper end of the rate range. I would like to see language prohibiting downward adjustment of rate ranges without expressed congressional approval. Performance-Based Pay As there are no final details on this procedure it is not possible to make exact comments. However there is a fundamental flaw in the “Pay for Performance” process. This works well when performance is inherently objective, such as sales, you either make sales or you don’t. But performance for most jobs in DOD is highly subjective. It is difficult to reach any agreement on what are the most important elements of any given job much less how well an employee is performing. Even once a determination is made as to the “critical elements” there are many factors outside the control of the member that can determine how well a member accomplishes these elements. In fact, outside factors such as organizational and team performance are listed as key elements determining pay. So if your organization is deemed less then great, a member’s performance is adversely affected even if he or she has performed in an outstanding manner! Who determines an organization or term performance for that matter? How does one objectively determine the value of a member’s contribution to DOD? A member could do an excellent job, but get a low rating as the rater decides the member’s job just isn’t that valuable. Also, how does “pay for performance” account for the different rating philosophy of different supervisors. I cannot foresee any way to ensure all supervisors throughout DOD rate people the same for the same level of performance. I believe this is a fatal flaw, it is simply not possible to have consistent and fair ratings throughout an organization the size and complexity of DOD. Pay and retention should not be tied to such a “luck of the draw” system. Subpart H Penalty Review Paragraph 7 limits MSPB ability to overturn a DOD decision to cases where DOD’s actions are determined to be “wholly without justification.” If the current system is too protective of the employee, this is way too protective of the agency. It raises an almost impossible standard to overcome. Since the agency can take action against an employee based on the preponderance of evidence, that should also be the standard for MSPB reviews of DOD decisions. I fear that by setting the board so high for MSPB reviews it will simply encourage members to go to court, which drives up the cost and time for both parties. Paragraph 8, recovery of Attorney Fees should be based on the above standard. Subpart I (16) Grievance Procedures Rating of record is not subject to grievance under this proposal, but as these rating are now absolutely critical to the members career they should be subject to formal grievance that is subject to outside review.