| Comment Number: | OL-10501632 |
| Received: | 2/27/2005 1:52:55 PM |
| Subject: | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment |
| Title: | National Security Personnel System |
| CFR Citation: | 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901 |
| No Attachments |
Comments:
Comments concerning - Federal Register: February 14, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 29) Proposed Rules: FR Document 05-2582/NSPS (National Security Personnel System) Page 7569: "If the union believes that management has inappropriately found contract provisions unenforceable, it may appeal such decisions to the National Security Labor Relations Board. " Yes, by all means appeal to an in-house board, packed with political appointees, selected by SECDEF. Where is the independence? "The Department will create a National Security Labor Relations Board (NSLRB) composed of at least three members appointed to fixed terms. The Secretary will appoint the members, ...." As above, where is the independence needed to fairly adjudicate cases. "DoD and OPM put a high premium on the opportunity to establish an NSLRB whose members would have a deep understanding of and appreciation for the unique challenges the Department faces in carrying out its national security mission." See above. This is a grotesque mockery of jurisprudence. "Both the NSLRB and FLRA must interpret the regulations in subpart I in a way that promotes the swift, flexible and effective, day-to-day accomplishment of the Department's mission as defined by the Secretary. The NSLRB is authorized to issue advisory opinions on important issues of law that are binding on the parties. These opinions will help both labor and management understand how key provisions of the regulations will be interpreted without the time and expense of years of litigation." If the case must be decided in favor of DoD, how is this independent. Where are the checks and balances needed to combat abuse? Where is the oversight?