Comment Number: OL-10503972
Received: 3/8/2005 9:16:46 AM
Subject: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment
Title: National Security Personnel System
CFR Citation: 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901
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Comments:

I am a federal personnel manager, with over 20 years experience in both the GS pay system and over 6 years' experience with an Army Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Project. The content of the draft NSPS regulations provide no specifics for specific comment. However, speaking from experience, I offer the following general concerns. Subpart B. Classification: no matter how the pay bands are drawn, or how GS grade levels are defined, supervisors must be knowledgeable enough of work performed and the personnel system to establish a means of fairly compensating it. The GS classification system provided the means to establish career ladder (i.e., GS 5/7/9/11) positions which in effect created a band. Supervisors could promote employees within the career ladder based on performance. There is no flexibility in the NSPS that was not previously in the GS classification system. The inability of supervisors to use tools already available was the limiting factor, and will not be cured by a different system. Subpart C. Pay Administration; Performance-based Pay. Having experienced performance-based pay, the major problem is the finite pool of money available under NSPS which is infinite under the GS system. In a demo project pay pool, money from WIGIs, promotions, and QSIs are lumped in a pay pool, which is a fixed dollar amount. In order for an employee to receive a high payment for good performance, someone else must receive a lesser payment; in other words, it's a "rank and yank" system. In the GS pay system, there is no artificial financial limitation placed on promotions, WIGIs and QSIs. If the agency can afford the total labor cost, these forms of payment for good performance are not limited in the GS pay system as they are in the NSPS. The reality under the Demo Project my position is covered by is that even when employees achieve the higher or highest performance scores possible, the pay pool limits the amount of pay for performance. If the ratings of the majority of employees in the pay pool are fully successful or better, the payment for performance for all goes down. Coupled with the inability to promote employees within a pay band, our good and better performers actually made out worse under the so-called pay for performance system. The only path to financial advancement under the NSPS within a pay band is through the annual payment for performance. Employee concerns about the ability or commitment of supervisors to know what their employees are actually doing and appraising their performance with credibility and constructive feedback is not affected at all by a different appraisal system. Lazy or ineffective managers will not use the NSPS tool any more effectively than any other pay for performance tool. The provisions in NSPS for the poorer performers to drop to the next lower pay band would require supervisors to give less than fully successful ratings that they can support on appeal/grievance, and again this seems to be beyond the capacity of most supervisors, in my experience. Such ratings will still require face to face counselling and documentation of the expectations not met. Supervisors will continue to avoid doing this regardless of which system they are in. Subparts G, H, and I are where the NSPS contributes positively to positive change in the Civil Service. The adverse action and appeals system is inordinately lengthy and offers redundant and intrusive avenues for review of adverse actions. The Labor Management Relations provisions are long overdue and will contribute greatly to enhancing local relationships (by eliminating local bargaining and emotional turmoil over matters that are not within local control anyway), reducing wasted time and cost, and allowing labor and management to focus on truly local issues. In summary, DoD should have spent these resources (for NSPS) on promoting understanding of the current GS system's flexibilities, and requiring accountability among DoD supervisors.