Comment Number: OL-10508611
Received: 3/15/2005 9:30:25 AM
Subject: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment
Title: National Security Personnel System
CFR Citation: 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901
No Attachments

Comments:

COMMENTS CONCERNING THE PROPOSED NSPS: Subpart A: Input from employees and the unions appear to be minimal and not overly considered. It appears that all critical elements of the Civil Service system were waivered; therefore allowing nepotism, no pay raises, etc. to get a foothold. Subpart A, Section 9901.105: There are too many issuances remaining that need to be solved before implementation should take place. Subpart B: Need to further definitize pay consideration and incentives. Yearly-type pay objectives should be put in place so that employees can more readily know what yearly goals are available. (The FAA has had no raises in the past two years.) Managers also seem to have “too much” impact now in pay performance results. Subpart C: Yearly-definitized pay incentives still need to be offered – with awards not being used as a substitute for pay raises. Employees should be allowed to participate in the pay pools used to determine pay increases and bonuses. Subpart D: By automatically waiving annual standards, management can pressure the employee into doing what managements wants - rather than what the employee would like to do. Employee behavior can be subjectively rated by managers, as it is perceived. Subpart E: It appears that non-competitive appointments could be many and not contested per NSPS. Also, employees may have less recourse to contest a management decision not in their favor. Subpart F: Placing performance at the top of a RIF list seems to give it too much creditability. Disregarding the other current factors, as “less important” is not necessarily wise or prudent, as there were long established reasons for this type of protection. Subpart G: Again, the mandatory removal issuances should be in place before implementing NSPS. Employees are entitled to know what these are and of the Secretary’s potential role in this process. Also, because of prior downsizing and increased workloads, employee response time should not be shortened. Subpart H: It appears that the Secretary has too much authority to review and possibly overrule MSPB decisions when it determines it wants to do so. Likewise, OPM can do the same thing. Also, it appears that too much authority is given to the Secretary and taken away from the MSPB in being able to mitigate penalties. Subpart I: The NSLRB has too much authority in bargaining rights of employees. Employees can “be overruled” if the Board sees fit. The Board can also conduct its own review of any DoD matter that it sees fit. The Secretary and Director can change job requirements and control completely, the work function of any employee without advance notice or representation. In addition, clerical jobs in personnel functions will not be able to be included in union representation. Another very significant point is that management has no obligation to bargain over DoD issuances – that aren’t even known to employees before implementation. And then management only has to bargain if these issuances are significant… a true “one-way” street. Again, not requiring multi-unit bargaining can only hurt employees in the units not being included. And exclusive jurisdiction in “exclusive recognition” seems very suspect. In addition, excluding pay, ratings of record and mandatory removal actions from negotiated grievance procedures smacks of “Head of State” status. Even the NSLRB has “its own jurisdiction” authority. Next Steps: 30 days is hardly enough time to review a document that took months and years to formulate. And, likewise, the ease of implementation by the Secretary and Director gives them too much authority over NSPS…again. The initial start-up costs and NSLRB seems grossly underestimated, as well as does the WGI “buyout” pay banding conversion. Also, it is an insult to state that this will result” in a more qualified and proficient workforce”! Also the Secretary and Director have sole authority to set and adjust local market supplements – not Congress, etc. By having such extensive appointing authority, it would appear that even nepotism could reappear again, as it was before Civil Service. Again, a large amount of authority will be offered DoD in controlling competitive areas and their determinations. This is also true for any adverse actions of which the Secretary is the sole “determiner”. In appeals, the MSPB has more restricted appeal authority than before. In labor relations, the NLSRB will perform under the cognizance of the Secretary and probably will be the final decision authority accountable to the Secretary. It also appears to give the Secretary “free reign” over how to manage and control DoD. This includes the right to recognize “exclusive bargaining” with labor representation. It also gives the Secretary sole authority to bargain at an organizational level above the level of exclusive recognition. Giving the NLSRB in- discriminate jurisdiction over any exceptions made, is likened to giving them the final ’say-so” over all exceptions. And finally, there should be a provision to be able to amend NSPS without leaving this solely up to the discretion of the President of the United States.