| Comment Number: | OL-10509304 |
| Received: | 3/15/2005 2:23:22 PM |
| Subject: | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment |
| Title: | National Security Personnel System |
| CFR Citation: | 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901 |
| No Attachments |
Comments:
§ 9901.409 Rating and rewarding performance Like a "big fish in a little pond", a mediocre performer working with even poorer peers will tend to be paid more than a higher performing worker whose peers are all high performers, also. An engineer doing relatively simple work extremely well in one office could be compensated significantly more than an engineer performing more complex work at an acceptable level in a different office. Quoting from "Equity and Fairness in Quantitative Employee Rating Systems" by Richard A. Albanese and Richard L. Medina (see Comment Number OL-10503002.) "the 'less contributing' the group you are in the greater your rewards may be despite the same performance as a colleague in a 'highly contributing' group." The failed General Manager (GM) system of the 1980's unfairly distributed the vast majority of funds to the select few at the top. How will you ensure "no forced distribution or quotas" in Performance Management while ensuring an equitable distribution based only on merit? Unlike the private sector, where higher performance can directly result in higher profits and therefore an increased pool of funds to compensate higher performing employees and managers, DOD has to rely on congressional appropriations that are neither sufficient nor timely. This inevitably leads to an under funded position for salary increases and penalizes some high performers.