Comment Number: | OL-10512023 |
Received: | 3/16/2005 8:00:19 PM |
Subject: | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Comment |
Title: | National Security Personnel System |
CFR Citation: | 5 CFR Chapter XCIX and Part 9901 |
No Attachments |
Comments:
1. The Case for Action (pgs 7552/7553) The case for action was not proven by the presented discussion. Further, by stating the intent is to create, "... a new way to manage its civilian workforce, ..." one could as easily argue the proposal regresses from 20th century management, in lieu of progressing to the 21st century. Current successful management philosphy contains thinking with reference to managing systems & projects and leading people. The flawed and fundamental belief one can manage people creates individual motivations at odds with creating the environment for improving our ability to respond more quickly to an unpredictable foe and/or emerging threats. 2.Rating Methodology: DoD (pg 7560) Perhaps the single brightest concept is review by the "pay pool panel to ensure equitable rating criteria and methodology have been applied to all pay pool employees." Strong consideration should be given to formalizing this concept in section 9901.342 (b). 3. Performance Management - Subpart D (pg 7561) The opening statement characterizing the the current performance system as "burdensome because of its actual and/or perceived inflexibility ... " is both wrong and misleading. Performance management is largely regarded as unimportant, and due to a lack of familiarity with some of the fundamental precepts of performance management, it becomes more difficult than it should be. This difficulty resides, primarily, with the supervisors who, as the result of culture within government service, have become remiss in developing their level of knowledge that is not regarded as important until the attempt to take performance-based adverse actions. It is no surprise to be told, given these circumstances, performance-based adverse actions are rarely upheld. During the post-cold war draw down of the early 90's, many commands converted to a pass/fail system of performance assessment to address many supervisor's inability do properly manage performance. This should be easy to confirm. 4. Workforce Shaping-Subpart F (pg 7564) Extending minimum RIF authority to an organizational unit will provide incentive for employees to make career decisions having the effect of weakening workforce abilities (and eventually the ability to respond aggressively to emerging challenges). By limiting an employee's ability to retreat to differing organiztional units within a command, incentive to diversify one's experience and be better prepared to move into higher leadership positions. Shipyards experienced this effect when reorganizing second level of blue collar supervision to align personnel with Project Management. Consideration should be given to further definition in Section 9901.605. 5. Appeals-Subpart H Section 2 (pg 7566) speaks of "an erroneous MSPB AJ decision" and its effect inhibitting "meaningful corrective action". While supporting a preponderance of evidence standard of proof (pg 7567), supporting discussion for DoD reviews and appeals attempts to create an unwarrented presumption of good faith in the "mission critical" motivations of the agency. 6. Appeals-Subpart H Section 8 (pg 7568) The rational given for excusion of attorney fee recovery provides an excuse for shoddy ivestigation. By including behaviorly based elements and/or objectives (pg 7562) in the performance management system, it seems a hypocritical to allow a poorly conducted investigation to justify forcing an employee to choose between remedy (already stacked unfairly in favor of the agency) and financial wherewithall to accomplish other life goals. I consider the "chilling effect" will be on the department's long-term employees' disappearance. Not many employees will choose to remain in service once the preception is created that leadership may behave in inaccountable ways with no consequences. Conclusion - The proposed regulations are a grab for additional (and largely unnecessary) unilateral say in the affairs of government employees. One is aligned for one's results.