[Email This]

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION
OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION1

Related Links Charges - Corp. Graner Charges - Spec. Sivits Charges - Sgt. Davis Military Lawyers Uniform Code of Military Justice The Law of War

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967

5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951

6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949

7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

8. DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972/p>

9. DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July 1979/p>

10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994/p>

11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6), 6 December 1994/p>

12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996

14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12 February 1998

17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993

18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993

19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988

20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31 September 2000

21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5 September 2003

22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993

23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988

24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000

26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002

27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002

29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998

30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999

31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001

32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002

34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000

35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May 1994

36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985

38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001

39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984

40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001

41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003

42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Battalion (IR)

43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Guard Company

44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Escort Guard Company

45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002

46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999

47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003

48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003

49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003

50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003

51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003

52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence- Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003

53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December 2003

54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter- Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations, 13 December 2003

56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002 Edition

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)

2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)

3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15- 6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:

1. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));

2. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;
3. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
4. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. (ANNEX 4)

4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities. In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)

5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)

6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)

7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in- depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees." Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)

3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)

4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the "guard force" be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)

REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)

1. (U) Detainee and corrections system management

2. (U) Detainee management, including detainee
   movement, segregation, and accountability

3. (U) Means of command and control of the detention
   and corrections system

4. (U) Integration of military detention and
   corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority
   (CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-
   run corrections system

5. (U) Detainee medical care and health management

6. (U) Detention facilities that meet required
   health, hygiene, and sanitation standards

7. (U) Court integration and docket management for
   criminal detainees

8. (U) Detainee legal processing

9. (U) Detainee databases and records, including
   integration with law enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder's team are beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is added in certain areas):

1. (U) Detainee Management (including movement,
   segregation, and accountability)

1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and
   approaches at the various detention facilities.
   Several Division/Brigade collection points and US
   monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently
   detailed use of force and other standing operating
   procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,
   improper restraint techniques, detainee management,
   etc.) Though, there were no military police units
   purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi
   facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi
   crimes) are detained with security internees (generally
   Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same
   facilities, though segregated in different
   cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of
   detained people in a single location by members of the
   same unit invites confusion about handling, processing,
   and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer
   of information between different categories of
   detainees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive
   Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific
   training during their mobilization period. Corrections
   training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R)
   Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one
   currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the
   other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
   JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention
   acility operations, to include two days of unarmed
   self-defense, training in interpersonal communication
   skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer
   safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and
Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task
organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of
both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to
force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion
and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the
400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and
redeployed in January 2004. The 724th MP Battalion
redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is
scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They
are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th
MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that
remain are generally understrength, as Reserve
Component units do not have an individual personnel
replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the
departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24
months of Federal active duty in a five-year period.
(ANNEX 19)

2. (U) The 800th MP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC
asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All
detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO;
Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a
separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges
adapting its task organizational structure, training,
and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct
standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait).
Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are
predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW
population, and not criminals or high-risk security
internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the
full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the
denial of these protections is due to specifically
articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to
preclude the direction of insurgency operations).
(ANNEXES ( 19) and 24)

5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM
3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,
require military police to provide an area for
intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection of
intelligence within a facility, do not participate in
Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby
military police actively set favorable conditions for
subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention
facility, attempting to maintain its population in a
compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has
not been directed to change its facility procedures to
set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor
participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23))

6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter
alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding
the command and control of detainees:

1. (U) Align the release process for security
   internees with DoD Policy. The process of
   screening security internees should include
   intelligence findings, interrogation results, and
   current threat assessment.

2. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that
   will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast
   Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi
   run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish
   procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers
   securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
   guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.

3. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee
   Operations, except the MEK security mission, under
   a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for
   OIF 2.

4. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate
   into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to
   conduct internment and confinement operations in
   support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

   IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT

   1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe
   detention and prison operations, identify potential
   systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term,
   mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7
   operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from
   US military control/oversight to the Coalition
   Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi
   Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG
   Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be
   implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)

   2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that
   surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very
   same issues that are the subject of this investigation.
   In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees
   occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.
   As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions
   of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG
   Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its
   conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked
   to change its facility procedures to set the conditions
   for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade
   and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for
   detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious
   from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects
   and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)

   3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding
   the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at
   passive collection of intelligence within a facility,
   should not participate in Military Intelligence
   supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military
   Police should not be involved with setting "favorable
   conditions" for subsequent interviews. These actions, as
   will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run
   counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
   (ANNEX 19)

   PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

   1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG
   Miller's Report, my investigation team immediately began
   an in-depth review of all available documents regarding
   the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the
   voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee
   abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the
   Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed
   approximately fifty witness statements from military
   police and military intelligence personnel, potential
   suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and
   videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention
   facility personnel, which are now in the custody and
   control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and
   the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are
   not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies
   of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and
   assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions
   involving that command for the past several months. (All
   ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)

   2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers
   from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the
   services of two individuals who are experts in military
   police detention practices and training. These were LTC
   Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion,
   United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth,
   and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US
   Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also
   requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry
   Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to
   assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)

   3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports,
   the team reviewed numerous reference materials including
   the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-
   Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and
   Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205th MI
   Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE),
   facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR
   15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)
   on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters
   from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES (5-20), 37, 93, and 94)

   4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a
   one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and
   the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become
   familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL
   Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation
   Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP
   Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade,
   and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7
   February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention
   Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and
   operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February
   2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive
   training sessions on approved detention practices. We
   continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID
   investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in
   Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the
   applicable reference materials within each team member's
   area of expertise, and practiced investigative
   techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to
   finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing
   witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect
   potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to
   arrange witness attendance, force protection measures,
   and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8
   February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and (25)

   5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority
   on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the
   upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command,
   I directed that several critical witnesses who were
   preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan,
   Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My
   team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted
   a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX
   30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February
   2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of
   witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we
   returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of
   witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28
   February we collected documents, compiled references, did
   follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis
   of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our
   investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive
   summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted
   the AR 15-6 written report with findings and
   recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark
   Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief
   to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on
   3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)

   FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
   

   (PART ONE)

   (U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

   1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)

   2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26), 34), 35), and 45-91)

   REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

   1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (Annex 31)

   2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (Annex 31)

   3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372nd MP Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company were located within the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)

   4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (Annex 45)

   5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)

   6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:

   1. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;
      jumping on their naked feet;

   2. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and
      female detainees;

   3. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various
      sexually explicit positions for photographing;

   4. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and
      keeping them naked for several days at a time;

   5. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's
      underwear;

   6. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate
      themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

   7. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and
      then jumping on them;

   8. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,
      with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
      sfingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

   9. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a
      detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old
      fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

   10. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked
       detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
       picture;

   11. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female
       detainee;

   12. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)
       to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
       one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

   13. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
       (ANNEXES 26 and 26)

   7. (U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):

   1. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

   2. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

   3. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

   4. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

   5. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp.,
      Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect

   6. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company

   7. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
      Battalion

   8. (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI
      Battalion

   9. (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp.,
      Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade

   10. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP
       Company

   11. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company

   12. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical
       Detachment

   13. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company

   8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX 26):

   1. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the
      phosphoric liquid on detainees;

   2. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;

   3. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

   4. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a
      chair;

   5. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

   6. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the
      wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
      against the wall in his cell;

   7. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
      perhaps a broom stick.

   8. h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and
      intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one
      instance actually biting a detainee.

   9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:

   1. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365

   2. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077

   3. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446

   4. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108

   5. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307

   6. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542

   7. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422

   8. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425

   9. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529

   10. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787

   11. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427

   12. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362

   13. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470
       (ANNEX 26)

   10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).

   11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25, and 26):

   1. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in
      her sworn statement regarding the incident where a
      detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his
      fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep
      detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL
      Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk.
      It is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI
      and OGA to get these people to talk."
      

   2. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in
      his sworn statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners
      in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various
      things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we
      were told that they had different rules and different
      SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP
      for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in
      charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the
      Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but
      nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic)."
      When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than
      the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The rest of
      the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military
      Intelligence (MI) holds." When asked why he did not
      inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis
      stated: " Because I assumed that if they were doing
      things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines,
      someone would have said something. Also the wing
      belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of
      the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
      insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When
      asked what MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for
      us." Make sure he has a bad night." "Make sure he gets
      the treatment." He claimed these comments were made to
      CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis
      stated that (sic): "the MI staffs to my understanding
      have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
      been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
      like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They
      answer every question. They're giving out good
      information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff
      like that."
      

   3. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked
      if he were present when any detainees were abused. He
      stated: "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take
      away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." He could
      not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but
      commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they
      needed to give me paperwork." He was later informed
      that "we could not do anything to embarrass the
      prisoners."
      

   4. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract
      translator was questioned about several detainees
      accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They (detainees)
      were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were
      there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT
      Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while
      questioning them to admit what they did. They made them
      do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump
      up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet,
      called them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they
      like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their
      hands together and their legs with shackles and started
      to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the
      bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."
      

   5. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
      Battalion, a medic testified that: "Cell 1A was used to
      house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to
      house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During
      my tour at the prison I observed that when the male
      detainees were first brought to the facility, some of
      them were made to wear female underwear, which I think
      was to somehow break them down."

      12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for
      Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the
      372nd MP Company had received no training in
      detention/internee operations. I also find that very
      little instruction or training was provided to MP
      personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
      Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
      FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that
      few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever
      made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)

      13. (U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership
      not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their
      tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee
      abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003.
      Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th
      MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military
      Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a
      number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca.
      An extensive CID investigation determined that four
      soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and
      beaten these detainees following a transport mission from
      Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)

      14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred
      against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation
      conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court
      martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski
      supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
      evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th
      MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions
      regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure
      that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any
      evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the
      Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took
      any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly
      trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)

      RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

      1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated
      multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of
      subject matter experts in internment/resettlement
      operations, international and operational law,
      information technology, facility management,
      interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques,
      chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices
      as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to
      oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects
      of detainee and confinement operations.
      

      2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence
      personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations
      or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate
      units, be immediately provided with training by an
      international/operational law attorney on the specific
      provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10,
      specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the
      Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War,
      Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other
      Detainees, and AR 190-8.

      3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for
      overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater
      of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal
      General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject
      matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7
      in coordinating detainee operations.

      4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation
      facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the
      Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
      of War and notice of protections be made available in
      both English and the detainees' language and be
      prominently displayed in all detention facilities.
      Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should
      be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.
      

      5. (U) That each detention facility commander and
      interrogation facility commander publish a complete and
      comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
      regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel
      be required to read the SOPs and sign a document
      indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
      

      6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG
      Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings and
      recommendations in this investigation, all units in the
      Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
      internment/confinement/detainment operations in support
      of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to
      include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
      

      7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for
      detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area
      (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by
      COMCJTF-7).

      8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be
      conducted to determine the extent of culpability of
      Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI
      Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
      (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
      

      9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee
      operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate,
      with specialized training and knowledge of international
      and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of
      detainee operations.

      FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

      (PART TWO)

      (U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and
      accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically
      allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib
      Prison:

      REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
      I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

      1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide
      Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)
      

      2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
      with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex
      during the time period covered in this investigation.
      (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)

      3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
      with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB)
      Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on
      26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)

      4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
      with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD
      Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)

      5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
      with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK
      holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)

      6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care,
      and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person,
      Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi
      criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)

      7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)

      8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge,
      implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,
      doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP
      Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness
      statements in ANNEXES 45-91). 9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after
      in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to
      detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to
      encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP
      Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)

      10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had
      a "Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training
      Outline" for transferring and releasing detainees, which
      appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)

      11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being
      documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS)
      and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by
      regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is
      underutilized and often does not give a "real time" accurate
      picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.
      (ANNEX 56)

      12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of
      detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP
      Battalion used a self-created "change sheet" to document the
      transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For
      proper accountability, it is imperative that these change
      sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated
      within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process
      would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-
      time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial
      Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee
      manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound,
      and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP
      Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David
      DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack
      of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)

      13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)

      14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)

      15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks were regularly inaccurate. (Annexes 22and 98)

      16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and "call-ups," which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (ANNEXES 63, 88, and 98)

      17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command. (ANNEX 37)

      18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites. (ANNEXES 44, 67, 71, and 85)

      19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance. (ANNEXES 76 and 82)

      20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience. (ANNEX 21)

      21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)

      22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off" as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)

      23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)

      24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing "Crimes Against the Coalition," who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the "Detainee Release Authority" for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)

      25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)

      26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

      27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)

      28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

      29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's Statement)

      30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc.), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

      31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

      32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this training. (ANNEXES 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)

      33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law. (ANNEX 53)

      34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from these reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:

      1. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional information was provided as requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)

      2. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)

      3. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that location. It is of particular note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the detainees' native languages. (ANNEX 6)

      4. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)

      5. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)

      6. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)

      7. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)

      8. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike," the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

      9. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)

      10. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd- dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)

      11. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

      12. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30- 40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd- dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)

      13. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 17)

      14. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca (310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)

      15. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

      16. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)

      17. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca (310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10- 15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)

      36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities and were not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (ANNEXES 5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

      RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:

      1. (U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed
         and referenced series of recommendations for improving the
         detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of
         operations.

      2. (U) Accountability practices throughout any particular
         detention facility must be standardized and in accordance
         with applicable regulations and international law.

      3. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be
         expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real
         time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred
         from one location to another.

      4. (U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must
         be immediately processed and updated into the system to
         ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or
         ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound
         guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees.

      5. (U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and
         detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this
         investigation as well as any previous findings,
         recommendations, and reports.

      6. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and
         understood at the lowest level.

      7. (U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate
         facilities from any other category of detainee.

      8. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the
         master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their
         detainees in real time and without waiting for their change
         sheets to be processed. This would also have the change
         sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the
         manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS
         system can be utilized for this function.

      9. (U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances
         within the detainment facilities must be immediately
         reported through both the operational and administrative
         Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The
         SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs
         until the situation is resolved.

      10. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation
          Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva
          Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and
          guard mount.

      11. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at
          any given facility. The observations and corrective actions
          that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the
          respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan
          of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented
          as a matter of policy.

      12. (U) There must be significant structural improvements
          at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes
          include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting,
          additional chain link fencing, staking down of all
          concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu
          Ghraib (BCCF) .

      13. (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must
          be prominently displayed in English and the language of the
          detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention
          facility IAW AR 190-8.

      14. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other
          contractors' access throughout the facility. Contractors
          and civilians must be in an authorized and easily
          identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from
          the masses of detainees in civilian clothes.

      15. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer
          period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll
          call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability.

      16. (U) The method for doing head counts of detainees
          within a given compound must be standardized.

      17. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must
          know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable
          Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references
          provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have
          enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for
          leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use
          them to maintain standardized operating procedures and
          efficient accountability practices.

      FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
      (PART THREE)

      (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

      Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I) personally interviewed the following witnesses:

      1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

      2. (U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

      3. (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA
         Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon,
         CFLCC SJA)

      4. (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer,
         800th MP Brigade

      5. (U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade

      6. (U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI
         Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)

      7. (U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

      8. (U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion

      9. (U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint
         Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI
         Brigade

      10. (U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion
          and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

      11. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

      12. (U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

      13. (U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP
          Brigade

      14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

      15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

      16. (U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

      17. (U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

      18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

      19. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

      20. (U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP
          Battalion

      21. (U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

      22. (U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

      23. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

      24. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

      25. (U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

      26. (U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander,
          310th MP Company

      27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

      28. (U) 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
          Company

      29. (U) 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander,
          800th MP Brigade

      30. (U) 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP
          Battalion

      31. (U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP
          Company

      32. (U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

      33. (U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major,
          320th MP Battalion

      34. (U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant
          Major, 800th MP Brigade

      35. (U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major,
          310th MP Battalion

      36. (U) 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP
          Company

      37. (U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
          Battalion

      38. (U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
          Company

      39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th
          MP Battalion

      40. (U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP
          Company

      41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

      42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

      43. (U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

      44. (U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP
          Detachment, 16th MP Brigade

      45. (U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, 523rd MP
          Detachment, 937th Engineer Group

      46. (U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal
          and Canine Unit

      47. (U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract
          Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

      48. (U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter,
          Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
          (ANNEXES 45 and (91)

      REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
      FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

      1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the
      800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG
      Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The
      800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in
      the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion,
      320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP
      Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and
      744th MP Battalion.
      (ANNEXES 41 and 45)

      2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the
      800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go
      home when all the detainees were released from the Camp
      Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation
      of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point,
      approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp
      Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening
      process, several thousand detainees were released. Many
      in the command believed they would go home when the
      detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the
      800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the
      Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This
      new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS
      when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few
      months there did not appear to have been any attempt by
      the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)

      3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of
      numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP
      Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills,
      particularly regarding internment/resettlement
      operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
      command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted
      to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc
      training by individuals with civilian corrections
      experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the
      Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
      

      4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately
      trained for a mission that included operating a prison or
      penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the
      Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the
      800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific
      training during their mobilization period. MP units did
      not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization
      and during the post mobilization training, and thus could
      not train for specific missions. The training that was
      accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and
      implemented at the company level with little or no
      direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade
      levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law
      enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that
      the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever
      requested specific corrections training from the
      Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army
      Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost
      Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary
      Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)

      5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian
      internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied
      heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had
      civilian corrections experience, including many who
      worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their
      civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had
      no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-
      19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task
      List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever
      developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout
      the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)

      6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th
      MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission
      for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an
      I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21
      battalions, and that the average battalion size element
      should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at
      a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski
      and her staff did a poor job allocating resources
      throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally
      housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was
      operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD
      Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also
      run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

      7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual
      replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses.
      Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from
      personnel shortages through release from active duty
      (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization.
      In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of
      life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was
      extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or
      MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks,
      random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to
      Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison
      complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade
      lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve
      serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past
      associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the
      Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence
      over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.
      (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal
      Observations of the Investigation Team)

      8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu
      Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and
      lack of effective communication between the Commander,
      205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
      after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP
      Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the
      FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility
      between commands, little coordination at the command
      level, and no integration of the two functions.
      Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with
      little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)

      9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was
      exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108
      issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment
      of 205th MI Brigade Commander's Responsibilities for the
      Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:
      

      • 3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

      • 3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR "SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."
      
      Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made
      all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander,
      205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer,
      rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units
      conducting detainee operations at that facility. This
      is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions
      and agendas assigned to each of these respective
      specialties. (ANNEX 31)

      10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces
      (UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as
      the detailed direction and control of movements or
      maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
      accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)
      

      
      "TACON is the command authority over assigned or
      attached forces or commands or military capability made
      available for tasking that is limited to the detailed
      direction and control of movements or maneuvers within
      the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned
      missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may
      be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any
      echelon at or below the level of combatant commander."
      
      
      
      

      11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this
      investigation, I find that there was little, if any,
      recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade
      or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence
      if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the
      Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the
      Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib
      (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON
      relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

      12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness
      statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP
      Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as
      if they were responsible for the security, health and
      welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu
      Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas
      clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

      13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that
      the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an
      extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous
      witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W.
      DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day
      basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P)
      Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two
      weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the
      pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion
      Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately
      followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the
      CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October
      2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of
      the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP
      Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC
      Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion
      assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no
      orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum
      from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command
      of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this
      removal and search for a replacement was communicated to
      the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to
      Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing
      one commander and replacing him with another serving
      Battalion Commander without an order and without
      notifying superior or subordinate commands is without
      precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was
      also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that
      resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was
      stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse
      which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater
      Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC
      (P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both
      a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P)
      Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled
      battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of
      detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum
      was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7
      Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

      14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted
      a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over
      four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation
      Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during
      much of her testimony. What I found particularly
      disturbing in her testimony was her complete
      unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of
      the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused
      or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her
      command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
      principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations of the Interview Team)

      15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from
      the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance
      from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames
      much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on
      MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the
      MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she
      blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider,
      the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant,
      MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in
      Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan
      because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib.
      (ANNEX 45)

      16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that
      the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
      might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the
      detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp
      Bucca in May 2003. She stated that "about the same time
      those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central,
      the decisions were made to give the guilty people at
      Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the
      soldiers, the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna
      go home." I think it important to point out that almost
      every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse
      of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late
      October and early November 2003. The photographs and
      statements clearly support that the abuses occurred
      during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for
      trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of
      until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence
      that the decision of numerous MP personnel to
      intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was
      influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases.
      (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)

      17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade
      S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially
      dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints,
      these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental
      effect on the Brigade Staff's effectiveness and morale.
      Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James
      O'Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to
      accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary
      Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the
      Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities,
      take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise
      their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)
      

      18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced standards:

      1. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP
         Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the
         fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and
         officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed
         to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours
         while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

      2. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on
         their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

      3. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have
         been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during
         this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES
         43 and 102)
         
      1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
         Brigade
         • Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander,
           CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.

      2. (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
         • GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
           10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to
           take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade
           Commander; filed locally
         • Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
           17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction
           of duty

      3. (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
         • GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
           20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers.
           (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
           vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

      4. (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
         • GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
           2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a
           violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field
           Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he
           personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.

         • GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
           10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security
           measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.

      5. (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade
         • GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
           2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
           alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.

      6. (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company
         • Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming
           an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in
           that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his
           female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be
           announced.

      7. (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company
         • GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
           20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
           (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
           vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

      8. (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major,
         800th MP Brigade
         • GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski,
           Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and
           dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted
           soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was
           removed from the CSM list.

      9. (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major,
         400th MP Battalion
         • GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
           20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
           (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
           vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally

      10. (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant,
          770th MP Company
          • GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
            20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
            (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
            vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

      11. (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,
          
          • GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
            2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
            alcohol; filed locally.

      12. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
          
          • Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from
            BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to
            adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG
            Karpinski; filed locally.

      d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not
      enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of
      the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical
      Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy
      was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and
      that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse
      the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as
      previously existed. (ANNEX 53)
      

      19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP
      Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq
      had very little contact during their tour of duty with
      either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski
      claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular
      visits to the various detention facilities where her
      Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar
      provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support
      her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that
      they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum.
      (Multiple Witness Statements)

      20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such
      as the difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of
      life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended
      time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize
      these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere
      that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and
      throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).
      

      21. As I have documented in other parts of this
      investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by
      BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff,
      Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in
      detainee operations and proficiency or that serious
      accountability lapses that occurred over a significant
      period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were
      corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee
      escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective
      action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or
      Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with
      detainees if they existed at all, were not read or
      understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission
      of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several
      detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no
      evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective
      training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers
      throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of
      the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of
      detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
      Observations of the Investigation Team )
      

      22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished
      in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious
      deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the
      performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the
      standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that
      incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that
      reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and
      leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited
      the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the
      most recent example of a poor leadership climate that
      "permeates the Brigade." I totally concur with LTG
      Sanchez' opinion regarding the performance of BG
      Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the
      Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)
      

      RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

      1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
      Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer
      Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have
      been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
      

      • Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level
        detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs
        for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers
        had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.

      • Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP
        Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections
        afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
        the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

      • Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation
        Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate
        commands.

      • Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG
        McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary
        authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer
        misconduct.

      • Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
        ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry
        Phillabaum.

      • Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
        ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff
        including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.

      • Failing to properly ensure the results and
        recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation
        reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several
        months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by,
        subordinate commanders.

      • Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards
        throughout her command.

      • Failing to establish a Brigade METL.

      • Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned
        tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.

      • Failing to ensure that numerous and reported
        accountability lapses at detention facisslities throughout
        Iraq were corrected.

      2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI
      Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of
      Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US
      Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which
      have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
      findings:
      

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command knew, understood, and followed the protections
        afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
        the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
        

      • Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      3.(U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
      Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General
      Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the
      Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which
      have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
      findings:

      • Failing to properly ensure the results,
        recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes
        and shootings over a period of several months were properly
        disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.

      • Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations
        from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by
        BG Karpinski.

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
        Operations.

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command knew and understood the protections afforded to
        detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
        of Prisoners of War.

      • Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      • Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
        standards, proficiency, and accountability.

      • Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and
        to task organize to accomplish his mission.

      4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint
      Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to
      205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty
      and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for
      the following acts which have been previously referred to in
      the aforementioned findings:
      

      • Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating
        Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        control knew, understood, and followed the protections
        afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
        the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
      • Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct
        authority working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at
        Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP
      Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion
      S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of
      Reprimand for the following acts which have been
      previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
      

      • Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC,
        on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to
        report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a
        subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
        Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to
        Soldier and not filed.

      • Failing to take corrective action and implement
        recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after
        receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
        Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective
        security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.

      • Failing to take appropriate action and report an
        incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed
        a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.

      6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP
      Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General
      Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts
      which have been previously referred to in the
      aforementioned findings:
      

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command knew and understood the protections afforded to
        detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
        of Prisoners of War.

      • Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      • Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
        standards, proficiency, and accountability.

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
        Operations.

      7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
      Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader
      and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand
      for the following acts which have been previously
      referred to in the aforementioned findings:
      

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command knew and understood the protections afforded to
        detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
        of Prisoners of War.

      • Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      • Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier
        standards, proficiency, and accountability.

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
        command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
        Operations.
      8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
      Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a
      General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following
      acts which have been previously referred to in the
      aforementioned findings:
      
      • Making a material misrepresentation to the
        Investigation Team stating that he had "never" been
        admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he
        had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG
        Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding
        facility.

      • Making a material misrepresentation to the
        Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift
        change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and
        that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper
        treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements
        contradict this assertion.

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP
        Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to
        detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
        of Prisoners of War.

      • Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      • Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
        standards, proficiency, and accountability.

      • Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
        trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

      9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
      Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of
      the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer
      Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have
      been previously referred to in the aforementioned
      findings:

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company
        knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in
        the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
        of War.

      • Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      • Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
        standards, proficiency, and accountability.

      • Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
        trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

      10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant,
      372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a
      General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive
      action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the
      following acts which have been previously referred to in
      the aforementioned findings:

      • Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and
        understood the protections afforded to detainees in the
        Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
        War.

      • Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
        "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

      • Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
        standards, proficiency, and accountability.

      • Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
        trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

      • Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct
        control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands
        and feet in his presence.

      11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian
      Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
      be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his
      employment file, termination of employment, and
      generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security
      clearance for the following acts which have been
      previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
      

      • Made a false statement to the investigation team
        regarding the locations of his interrogations, the
        activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of
        abuses.

      • Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in
        interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by
        "setting conditions" which were neither authorized and in
        accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly
        knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.

      12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian
      Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
      be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his
      employment file and have his security clearance reviewed
      by competent authority for the following acts or concerns
      which have been previously referred to in the
      aforementioned findings:

      • Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in
        violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness
        statements.

   6. Did not have a security clearance.

      13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information
      to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army
      Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the
      extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the
      205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and
      Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
      Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC
      Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John
      Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for
      the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend
      immediate disciplinary action as described in the
      preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a
      Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of
      their culpability. (ANNEX 36)

      OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS

      1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I
      acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF
      Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from
      a psychological perspective. He determined that there
      was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the
      detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select
      soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There
      was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and
      command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is
      contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

      2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted
      a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over
      four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation
      Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during
      much of her testimony. What I found particularly
      disturbing in her testimony was her complete
      unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of
      the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused
      or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her
      command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
      principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)

      3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.

      1. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis
         McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention
         Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission
         requirements with little to no guidance from the
         800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined,
         proficient, and appeared to understand their basic
         tasks.

      2. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC
         Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK
         Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers
         were proficient in their individual tasks and
         adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal
         operation.

      3. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing
         perimeter security and force protection at Abu
         Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded
         standards be enforced and worked endlessly to
         improve discipline throughout the FOB.

      4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed
      and believe should be favorably noted include:
      

      1. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro,
         US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to
         participate in improper interrogations despite
         significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu
         Ghraib.

      2. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
         discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to
         military law enforcement.

      3. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took
         immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported
         the incident to the chain of command.

         CONCLUSION

         1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious
         acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu
         Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key
         senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th
         MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations,
         policies, and command directives in preventing detainee
         abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the
         period August 2003 to February 2004.
         

         2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations
         of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in
         previous assessments are essential to establish the
         conditions with the resources and personnel required to
         prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.
         

         Annexes

         1.    Psychological Assessment
         2     Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM
         3     Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation
         4     Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba
         5     15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003
         6.    15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003
         7.    15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003
         8.    15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003
         9.    15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004
         10.    15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004
         11.    SIR 5 November 2003
         12.    SIR 7 November 2003
         13.    SIR 8 November 2003
         14.    SIR 13 December 2003
         15.    SIR 13 December 2003
         16.    SIR 13 December 2003
         17.    SIR 17 December 2003
         18.    Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004
         19     MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003
         20     MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003
         21    AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
         22    22.    FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001
         23    23.    FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
         24    24.    Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949
         25    25.    CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004
         26    26.    CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004
         27.    800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004
         28.    205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated
         29.    TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding witnesses
         30.    Investigation Team's witness list
         31    FRAGO #1108
         32    Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated
         33.    FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
         34     CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June 2003
         35     Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003
         36.    AR 381-10, 1 July 1984
         37     37.    Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion
         38.    310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP
         39.    320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"
         40.    Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC) Slides, Undated
         41.    Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004
         42.    Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001
         43.    General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand
         44.    800th MP Battalion's TACSOP
         45    BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
         46     COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
         47.    COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice
         48.    LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade
         49.    LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade
         50.    LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical exploitation)
         51.    LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
         52.    LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion
         53.    LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
         54.    LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
         55.    LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
         56.    MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
         57.    MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
         58.    MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
         59.    MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
         60.    MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
         61.    MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
         62.    CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
         63.    CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
         64.    CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
         65.    CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
         66.    CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
         67.    LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
         68.    CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
         69.    CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
         70.    CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
         71.    1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
         72.    1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade
         73.    1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion
         74.    2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
         75.    CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
         76.    CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion
         77.    SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
         78.    CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion
         79.    1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
         80.    SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
         81.    MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
         82.    MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion
         83.    SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
         84.    SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
         85.    SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
         86.    SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
         87.    SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
         88.    SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
         89.    MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
         90.    Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade
         91    Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
         92.    FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
         93    CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated
         94    CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
         95    95.    800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
         96.    Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
         97    530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004
         98.    Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004
         99.    SIR 14 January 2004
         100.   Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
         101.   2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion
         102.   Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski, 17 January 2004
         103.   Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion
         104.   205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003
         105.   SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company
         106.   1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company
         
         
         

         --------------------------------------------------

         Footnote 1   Although the Taguba Report is marked Secret / No Foreign Dissemination, it has been widely distributed, and made available to the public worldwide since at least the week of May 2, 2004.